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Introduction
Previous papers in this conference have examined the
data available to track foodborne pathogens from their
sources to resulting illness for consumers. In this session,
Roberts, Ahl, and McDowell have shown us how such
data might ideally be put to use in risk assessment.
Beyond risk assessment, however, is the need for data to
inform public policy decisions about managing the risks
from foodborne pathogens and options for controlling the
level of safety in the U.S. food supply. Good public
policy decisions and consideration of regulatory options
involve choices. Alternatives are weighed based on their
costs and benefits, which in turn requires knowledge
about producer and consumer behavior and their
responses to incentives. While many alternatives may
have positive benefits, it is important to identify those
with the highest benefits relative to costs. Because
economic costs and benefits matter in public policy, we
focus on data needs that will support choosing cost-
effective public policies and generate incentives that are
appropriate to achieving improved food safety.
In our paper, we examine how data can be used to
evaluate policy options for managing the risks from
foodborne microbial pathogens. We begin by reviewing
the current policy structure for managing food safety
risks, then we discuss the nature of the failure in markets
for food safety and the range of options for intervention.
Next we discuss how evaluation might proceed for either
a standards-based approach that is focused on the Hazard
Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) system, or for
incentive-based approaches that are focused on providing
information. Finally, we provide an overview of the data
that are needed for an economic cost-benefit analysis of
policy options.
Policy Background
The current system for assuring a safe supply of meat in
the United States has evolved over the years, largely in
response to changes in the production, processing, and
distribution of meat products. Federal meat inspection
legislation for ensuring the wholesomeness of American
beef and meat dates back to 1890 (USDA FSIS, 1995).
The Federal Meat Inspection Act of 1906 established
today’s standards for slaughter and processing of meats,
including postmortem inspection of carcasses. Poultry
products were added under the Poultry Products Inspec-
tion Act of 1957. Both antemortem and postmortem
inspection of animals and sanitary standards for slaughter
and processing facilities come under the legislation.
Today, two different Federal agencies share primary
responsibility for ensuring the safety and quality of meat
and poultry products: the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS),
through inspection of meat, poultry, and eggs; and the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which is responsi-
ble for ensuring the safety of domestic and imported food
products by establishing standards of identity and quality,
and regulating food processing and food establishments
(except for meat, poultry, and some egg products).1
Seafood also comes under FDA jurisdiction.
In addition to establishing standards of identity and
quality, FDA’s primary responsibility is to protect human
health from food hazards after food enters the market.
FDA has limited jurisdiction over meat and poultry
production processes, only acting when there are actual or
potential contamination or unsanitary conditions in its
distribution.
In contrast to FDA, FSIS focuses on inspection of the
processing and safety of food before it enters the final
marketing and distribution channels. FSIS administers
meat and poultry inspection in slaughtering and process-
ing plants. FSIS inspection relies primarily on the inspec-
tor’s sight, smell, and touch to detect abnormalities in
1Food safety activities at USDA, including on-farm programs and egg
inspection, have recently been consolidated under FSIS. In addition to
FDA and FSIS, other agencies play a peripheral role in meat product
food safety through their authority over particular issues. For example,
the Environmental Protection Agency sets pesticide residue tolerances
for all foods, including meats. In addition to Federal activities, State and
local authorities have jurisdiction over food retail establishments.
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animals or carcasses, with on-the-spot corrective action.
Recently, FSIS has taken steps to develop an inspection
system that is based on more formalized assessment of
the risks that are present in slaughter and processing
plants (USDA FSIS, 1995).
However, the food safety problems of greatest concern
today can neither be consistently identified through the
current FSIS inspection programs nor be controlled
through the FDA’s standards and procedures [USDA
FSIS, 1993). The most serious foodborne threats to public
health from meat, poultry, and seafood products are from
microorganisms that are hard to detect and prevent with
current inspection and control procedures. Producers,
processors, government, and consumers all play a role in
controlling microbial contamination.
The complex nature of foodborne microbial hazards
means that there is no one approach that will assure
complete safety from them. The analysis and assessment
of risks involved in meat and poultry production, process-
ing and distribution are essential to the development of
public strategies for managing food safety risks, for
appropriate regulatory response, and for creating incen-
tives for producers and consumers to achieve improved
food safety levels. The rest of this paper considers the
economic aspects of the issue, and how economic
analysis can help to choose among management
strategies.
How Economists Define the Food Safety
Problem
Safety is an attribute of food products associated with
reduced risk or chance of foodborne illness. If consumers
can ascertain the level of safety or risk associated with a
food prior to its purchase and understand the true risks to
health, then they could choose among products to obtain
the preferred level of food safety. In doing so, consumers
could express their willingness to pay for varying levels
of safety. A market for safety attributes would exist, with
the cost of safety (including the personal “costs” of
taking precautions) balanced against its value to consum-
ers. However, safety usually is not ascertainable directly.
Consumers do not always have complete information
about the safety of food when they buy it. Furthermore, if
they become ill from foodborne pathogens, they may
have difficulty recognizing the source. Producers or
processors also do not always have information about the
safety of their products, and it may be costly or impossi-
ble for them to respond to consumer demand for im-
proved safety. This lack of information creates a “market
failure.” Producers have little incentive to provide greater
levels of food safety, since consumers will not pay for an
attribute that they cannot verify.
Another aspect of this market failure is that the transac-
tion costs of reaching agreement on the level of safety
and the price premium are high. Although the current
legislative and legal systems determine who is responsi-
ble or “at fault” for failure to assure safe food, the costs
of actually deciding who is at fault are often very high.
Given the fact that food handling from “farm to table”
contributes to the final product, there is a relatively high
degree of integration required to protect the food supply.
Hence, it is difficult to identify who is at fault when a
failure occurs. High transaction costs associated with
negotiating agreements and the difficulty of assigning
liability mean that private markets may fail to achieve the
preferred level of food safety.
This market failure-the lack of information about safety
and the high costs of achieving agreements privately-
creates a public health problem. This problem is the
fundamental justification for public intervention to
improve food safety. Although Federal interventions in
thi  area date from 1890, the Government’s role has been
the subject of renewed attention in recent years. Several
structural changes may account for the growing attention
to food safety issues.
More people are highly susceptible to microbial food-
borne illness than before as the population ages, as
medical technology keeps ill people alive longer, and as
chronic illnesses that suppress people’s immune systems
(such as AIDS, diabetes, and cancer) spread. A recent
Council for Agricultural Science and Technology report
estimates more than 30 million individuals are at espe-
cially high risk today.
Another structural change is the growing popularity of
convenience foods and food away from home. The
proportion of food expenditures away from home has
increased from 34 percent in 1970 to 46 percent in 1993
(USDA ERS, 1994). The food-away-from-home sector
includes a wide variety of outlets in addition to restau-
rants (see figure 1), such as food prepared in grocery
stores; food served in institutions like day care centers,
college dormitories, or nursing homes; and food served at
recreational establishments. The increased proportion of
food consumption in the away-from-home sector reduces
consumers’ control over food preparation and may alter
the nature of foodborne risks.
The value consumers place on food safety depends on
their information about foodborne risks and their own
usceptibility and ability to take precautions. News stories
on recent outbreaks have heightened consumer awareness
and have increased information about the nature of
foodborne pathogen risks in the food supply. Thus,
co sumers may now place a higher value on reducing
risks from microbial pathogens, even though such risks
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Figure 1
Food expenditures, 1993
to their foodborne sources. Continued development of
inexpensive, rapid tests will detect contaminants in foods
and permit statistically based testing. The adaptation of
HACCP systems to slaughter and processing for raw
meat and poultry is another technological innovation that
could lower the cost of providing a safer food supply.
These advances create new opportunities for controlling
foodborne pathogens. In other words, the cost of supply-
ing food safety is lower.
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are small. These structural changes, the increased popula-
tion at risk, the changing structure of food markets, and
growing consumer awareness lead to greater demand for
food safety.
In addition to changes in demand, the improved ability to
supply food safety through scientific advances is an
impetus for increased attention to the regulation of food
production and distribution. New pathogen tests and
improved epidemiological methods link human diseases
Taken together, these changes in demand and supply
suggest that a higher level of food safety should be
observed, if interventions can be designed that allow
these changes to be effective in the marketplace. Market
interventions can take many forms, but all of them seek
to address the fundamental information problem and the
need for appropriate incentives for producers and con-
sumers. We categorize market interventions into five
types (adapted from Litan and Nordhaus, 1983, p. 38),
distinguished by whether they are based on command and
control or incentives (table 1).
Table 1-Possible interventions to correct
market failure due to insufficient
information
Type of intervention Examples
Command-and-control type:
Process standards
Outcome standards
Mandatory disclosure
Incentive-based type:
Providing information to the
public
Private bargaining
Specifying how prod-
ucts are produced
Testing and inspection
to ensure that products
meet a particular safety
standard
Requiring producers
to reveal level of safety
Informing consumers
about how to avoid
risk; subsidizing food
safety research to
improve information
technologies
Providing voluntary
certification of safety
for certain producers,
with possible public
verification
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Command and control approaches include setting stan-
dards for product content (outcome) or for processing
techniques. Product control is achieved by setting stan-
dards for any product that enters the market or at various
stages of the marketing channel. Visual inspection of
products and setting appropriate microbiological limits at
different points in production and distribution are
methods of guaranteeing an end product of a specified
quality. Such standards require the product’s quality to be
monitored (usually based on sampling and testing). In
contrast, production or processing standards achieve an
improved final product by directly specifying the pro-
cesses or procedures to be followed in production.
Examples include requiring specific product washing
solutions or chill temperatures.
One example is in organic or “natural foods” markets,
where private organizations certify organic produce or
certain production methods and a market for their
products has developed. Another example is where food
processors privately negotiate that certain standards of
production (or nonuse of certain inputs) be met by farm-
level producers. Finally, markets for products that meet
higher standards of safety may develop to meet the needs
f s lf-identified high-risk populations, such as nursing
home residents or the immune-suppressed population.
Evaluating a Standards-Based Approach:
HACCP
Mandatory disclosure of information is a command
intervention that takes a different approach. For example,
labeling is required for certain nutritional attributes of
packaged foods, such as fat content, in order to give
consumers information about product qualities that would
be very costly to observe. However, it may be difficult to
enforce disclosure of information about microbial patho-
gens, since producers do not always know the level of
safety being produced or contained in the product at sale.
Producers could be required to provide information on
the production processes, such as irradiation, that they
use.
The National Research Council (1985) has suggested
HACCP as a standard for achieving greater safety in
meat and poultry production. HACCP is already widely
recognized in the food industry as an effective approach
to establishing good production, sanitation, and manufac-
turing practices that produce safe foods that are likely to
withstand some variation in food handling and storage.
This strategy for controlling food processing relies on
identification and control points in the production process
where problems can occur.
Incentive-based approaches allow market participants to
choose the use of inputs, technologies (in the case of
producers), or among products or home production
technologies (in the case of consumers). One way to
facilitate such choices is by giving the public information.
Additional product information allows consumers to more
effectively weigh their willingness to pay for safer food
against higher prices or to alter their own food handling
instead of paying those costs. Labeling meat and poultry
products with safe handling instructions is a way to give
consumers information about how to reduce risks.
Another example of information for the public is instruc-
tion about safe food handling for employees in food
service establishments. Government can also affect the
information available to industry or consumers by subsi-
dizing food safety research that will reduce the cost of
obtaining information. Incentive-based approaches are
designed to induce either producers or consumers to
identify and practice cost-effective methods that achieve
desired (higher) levels of food safety.
HACCP is designed to be a preventive system that
focuses inspection and resources on areas critical to
achieving product safety. Prevention is seen as more cost-
effective than testing a product, and then destroying or
reworking it. The system can be applied to control any
stage in the food system, and involves sufficient trace-
ability and feedback in the process to direct corrective
activities.
There are seven principles involved in developing and
operating a HACCP program (National Advisory Com-
mittee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, 1992):
1. Assess the hazard, list the steps in the process where
significant hazard can occur, and describe the
prevention measures.
2. Determine critical control points (CCP’s) in the
process.
3 . Establish critical limits for each CCP.
4. Establish procedures to monitor each CCP.
Another way to motivate improved food safety is to
foster opportunities for private bargaining in order to
establish a market for reduced risk. This can be an
effective strategy, especially where the number of
“players” is relatively small or can be easily identified.
5. Establish corrective actions to be taken when mon-
itoring indicates a deviation from the CCP limits.
6. Establish recordkeeping for the HACCP system.
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7. Establish procedures to verify that the HACCP
system is working.
The HACCP system has proved to be a very effective
method to focus inspection and attention on CCP’s, and
improve the scientific basis for safety and control pro-
cesses. A CCP is “any point in the chain of food produc-
tion from raw materials to finished product where the
loss of control could result in unacceptable food safety
risk” (Pierson and Corlett, 1992, p. 3).
The concept of CCP is key to the control system and
very demanding in terms of required resources and
information. Monitoring of CCP’s is done best by using
indicators or characteristics that are easily measurable.
This focus on measurable indicators can provide a more
cost-effective approach to control than product sampling
and testing, which is inherently expensive and often time-
consuming.
HACCP was originally developed as a management tool
by the private sector, and has only recently been pro-
posed as a regulatory tool. It has been widely applied in
food processing where product liability may create a
greater need for industry to control processes, than in
production of unprocessed products. A recent study by
Karr showed that only 10 percent of meat and poultry
plants in the Northeast currently use HACCP. Adoption
of HACCP requires a firm to commit resources to
achieving product quality. Over 60 percent of the
companies in Karr’s survey indicated they lacked ade-
quate staff to implement HACCP.
Clearly there are costs to the firm for implementing a
HACCP system. Without public intervention (regulation),
firms will adopt HACCP as a means of ensuring a certain
safety content in their products if there is some return in
the marketplace for their efforts. The standards may be
adopted as part of “good management practice,” or to
achieve a product standard that can be identified in the
market and for which consumers will pay a higher price
to compensate for the additional processing costs. If
Karr’s adoption rate is representative, then these incen-
tives do not seem to exist currently for most firms in
meat and poultry slaughter and processing.
In adapting HACCP as a regulatory tool to correct the
failure in the market for food safety, it is important to
recognize that there are limits to its use. HACCP is not
designed to replace management decisionmaking relative
to product design, choice of inputs, or product marketing.
That is, weighing potential benefits from product design
and qualities against costs, as well as weighing the value
of improved safety versus the costs of achieving it are
aspects of managerial decisions not addressed through
HACCP processes. HACCP supports good production
practices, but management (or the regulatory agency) has
discretion to determine what the final product standard
will be. To a large extent, these issues enter into the
firm’s deliberations in determining CCP’s and tolerance
limits at CCP’s.
The explicit or implicit choice of a safety standard to be
achieved through the use of HACCP has important
implications for its use as a regulatory tool. Although
HACCP is a process approach, in practice it may or may
not be a process standard. The implementation of
HACCP requires the choice of an outcome standard that
the CCP’s are selected to achieve.
S tting up a HACCP system involves verification (prod-
uct testing) to ensure that the CCP’s are working. Thus,
requiring firms to adopt HACCP also implies requiring a
particular standard for food safety, and the selection of
the standard will have important implications for evaluat-
ing policy.
The dual nature of HACCP as both a process and a
product standard is widely misunderstood. It is important
because economists argue that process standards are
inefficient; they specify how firms should achieve goals
rather than specifying the product standard and allowing
firms to choose the least expensive process for achieving
it. From this perspective, setting product standards and
allowing choice and, over time, innovation, to meet them
should allow greater efficiency in meeting a particular
public health goal.
However, food safety regulation is not as simple as this
economic truism suggests. First, food safety outcomes are
expensive to test and monitor. As mentioned previously,
HACCP provides an efficient control approach because it
r lies on prevention and identification of measurable
CCP’s rather than ex post testing. Second, process
standards can be rigid or very flexible in practice.
HACCP is a general conceptual approach that can be
adapted in many different ways to processes in individual
plants and at all stages of production, processing, and
distribution. Thus, its flexibility allows firms some choice
in meeting the regulated standard. Third, inspection and
verification by the regulatory agency can be more
efficient when it is focused on prevention. Checking
CCP’s and verifying a HACCP program that is in place
may be a more efficient way of regulatory monitoring
than testing product. Thus, HACCP can have some
attractive features as an efficient regulatory tool, in spite
of its appearance as a process standard.
How could HACCP be evaluated as a potential policy
option? The costs and benefits of any particular HACCP
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regulation will depend on the accompanying implicit
standard for safety improvement. The benefits would
flow from that standard and the corresponding fewer
cases of foodborne illness. The costs of these avoided
illnesses would give a lower bound estimate of the
benefits of a HACCP regulation. The costs of the regula-
tion would be the firms’ costs to set up and maintain a
HACCP system. It may be important to recognize
differences among firms in the costs of implementing
HACCP. The challenging part of evaluating HACCP is
likely to be directly linking its adoption to specific
reductions in pathogens and in foodborne illnesses.
In the past, industry has applied HACCP to control
hazards where a zero-risk standard is appropriate (e.g.,
broken glass in canned food). For microbial pathogens,
particularly in unprocessed products, a zero-risk standard
may or may not be appropriate. Establishing the critical
limits that must be met at each CCP for microbial
contamination is likely to involve many tradeoffs.
Application of HACCP to these kinds of hazards will
require marginal cost-benefit analyses, where the value of
reducing risk to very low levels is weighed against the
additional costs.
Evaluating Incentive-Based Approaches to
Regulation
Consumers carry out food handling and storage. Well-
informed consumers fully understand the characteristics,
including the risks, of products they buy and consume,
and are well-informed about (and adequately able to
achieve) cooking and food handling methods that will
ensure the food’s safety. Thus, an alternative to regulat-
ing food safety is to shift some of the burden of choosing
and maintaining product standards to consumers through
practices such as food labeling. With labeling, consumers
are informed about the product’s characteristics but they
also assume some responsibility for ensuring its safety.
Providing information is an incentive-based approach
because it allows individual actors in the market to
exercise choice. This has the advantage of leading to
more efficient market outcomes. If a small but significant
number of consumers desires greater safety, then provid-
ing information can allow that group to express their
preferences through personal behavior or willingness to
pay. If some firms can produce a safer product at a lower
cost, then public or privately sponsored certification can
allow those firms to exploit a market niche for safety,
while other firms can produce at lower cost for the rest
of the market. When such a market niche exists, it
provides incentives over time for the development of less
expensive production methods to ensure safety. It can
also allow increased demand for safer products to be
reflected in higher price premiums.
Providing information suffers from some general draw-
backs that are related to consumers’ ability to use it. The
challenge in designing this kind of intervention is to
structure the information so that it allows consumers to
make better decisions (Magat and Viscusi, 1992).
Consumers have limited time and ability to process
information, particularly with respect to small risks. They
can become overloaded with information, and the impact
of this regulatory tool can easily be diluted by overuse.
In addition, consumers may be prevented from exercising
their choice due to the structure of the market. An
increasing proportion of food is consumed away from
home. Consumers in nursing homes or day care centers
h ve little choice or control over food safety, yet they are
among those who are most vulnerable to foodborne
disease.
The design of information interventions can be complex.
First, a risk assessment is needed to identify where
behavior can be modified to reduce risk. For example, in
designing information about safe handling, first it would
be useful to know the incidence of pathogens in products
entering the home, the incidence of foodborne illness
arising from food preparation in the home, and the
current use of safe handling practices by consumers. If
most foodborne illness arises in the away-from-home or
prepared foods subsector, then safe handling labels will
have little impact. Alternatively, if most consumers
already follow safe handling practices, then identifying
those who do not would be a way to target educational
efforts. Answers to these kinds of questions can help to
assess whether or not safe handling labels contribute to
better consumer decisionmaking.
The second step would be to evaluate the costs and
benefits of the information intervention. Magat and
Viscusi argue that interventions to provide safe handling
instructions to consumers should be evaluated with
respect to whether better decisions are made, which is
inherently difficult to measure. If decisions are improved,
then how much will risks be reduced? Only with answers
to these questions can the benefits of labeling be
evaluated.
Another information approach would be voluntary
ertification of higher levels of safety for some products.
This approach allows a market to develop for higher
afety, with the equilibrium premium for safety deter-
mined by the value of safety to consumers and the costs
to firms of improving safety. The higher level of safety
may be of particular interest to certain high-risk groups.
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In this case, the public role is to certify that products
meet a particular safety standard or that the production
process that is advertised as leading to a safer product
does in fact produce one (e.g., egg pasteurization).
Choosing the safety standard that improves welfare is the
challenge. Safety is a continuous attribute, but certifica-
tion generally distinguishes only between high and low
quality. The high-quality product needs to have a safety
difference great enough to elicit a price premium. How-
ever, if the safety level is too high, it may preclude the
development of a market because costs are also high and
the number of interested consumers is small. If it is too
low, it will not reduce risks significantly or motivate
industry to improve safety.
Evaluating the costs and benefits of a certification inter-
vention requires assessing the extent of market demand
for the certified product and the resulting risk reduction.
Useful information would include the consumers’ will-
ingness to pay for increased safety levels, particularly by
consumers in high-risk groups or by institutions serving
those consumers. Such willingness-to-pay estimates
would indicate the potential value of higher safety and
the potential market for a certified product. The social
value of the certification program could then be measured
by the reduced costs of illness resulting from market
behavior or the willingness to pay for reduced risks.
These could be compared to the costs to industry for
providing a particular level of safety and the costs to
Government agencies for certifying that safety level.
Answers to these questions would indicate whether a
market could develop for certification of a particular level
of safety, and how far that market would go towards
achieving public health goals.
Providing information may or may not represent the best
approach to food safety, and must be designed and
evaluated carefully. As Magat and Viscusi note, provid-
ing information is often attractive as a stopgap measure
when risky behavior is likely to continue and the risks
are small. However, some food safety risks are large. It
may make economic sense to combine information with
standards that exclude the lowest levels of safety from
the market. Evaluating such a mixed approach is more
complex, but it could be the basis for designing interven-
tions that achieve better public health at the least cost.
Food Safety Indicators for Policy Analysis
The previous sections have outlined the kind of informa-
tion needed to evaluate potential policies to reduce risks
from foodborne illness. This section discusses some ideal
indicators that might be developed to facilitate policy
analysis. Indicators are constructed from time series data
in order to interpret trends easily. One familiar economic
indicator is the consumer price index, which is con-
structed from price series data to provide an indicator of
inflation. In the food safety area, many data series are in
their infancy, so no indicators have been developed. A
regular series of food safety indicators could provide
information on the nature and extent of the food safety
problem, and could be used to analyze the effects of food
safety policies.
For example, a cost-of-illness index could be constructed
from data on the incidence of illness and health care
c sts to indicate how the economic dimension of the food
safety problem is changing over time. If broken down by
pathogen, cost-of-illness indicators would show the rela-
tive economic importance of different pathogens. Other
xamples would be indicators showing the incidence of
pathogens in farm animals, the adoption of management
practices to control pathogens, and the costs of those
practices. Such indicators could be used to analyze the
costs of reducing pathogens at the farm level or the dis-
tribution of problems to be targeted for increased control
or intervention. Data on the adoption of HACCP, the
incidence of pathogens in products, and the costs associ-
ated with HACCP could be used to analyze the costs of
reducing pathogens in meat products. Data on food intake
and preparation methods for population subgroups could
facilitate analysis of the distribution of benefits from
reducing hazards.
As many food safety data series are in their infancy, it
would be useful to outline potential indicators now in
order to guide data collection efforts. There are four basic
types of indicators: economic, proxy, physical, and distri-
butional (Nelson and Miranowski, 1994). An economic
indicator shows the severity of the food safety problem
by measuring its cost to society. A proxy indicator shows
the potential for a food safety problem; a physical indica-
tor directly measures the existence of a food safety pro-
bl m and its biological severity. Distributional indicators
show how the risks and costs of risk reduction are dis-
tributed across different kinds of consumers and produc-
ers. Distribution is an additional dimension of any other
indicator.
Table 2 shows some possible indicators and data sources.
An example of a proxy indicator is the incidence of a
pathogen in live animals or on slaughtered carcasses,
which shows a potential food safety problem. The inci-
dence of foodborne illness in the population from a
particular pathogen would be a physical indicator that
would show the existence of the problem. An economic
indicator would be the costs of any illness caused by a
p rticular pathogen. An example of a distributional
indicator would be the incidence of illness in certain
subpopulations. These examples demonstrate that proxy
or physical indicators, and a scientific basis for linking
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Table 2-Potential food safety indicators at various stages in the food chain
Type of
indicator Farm
Slaughter/
processing Retailing Consumer
Proxy
Physical
Economic
Distributional
Potential
data sources1
Nonadoption
of control measures
Pathogens in
farm animals
Cost of control
measures
Geographic
distribution
of pathogens
in farm animals
APHIS/FSIS
Nonadoption
of HACCP
Pathogens in
meat products
Cost of control
measures
Incidence of
pathogens by
firm size
FSIS/industry
Nonadoption
of HACCP
Pathogens
at point of sale
Cost of control
measures
Incidence of
pathogens by
firm size
State and local
agencies
Intake of
risky foods;
nonadoption
of precautions
Incidence of
illness
Benefits of reducing
illness; willingness to
pay for reduced risk;
price premiums paid
for safer products
Incidence of
illness by age
ERS/ARS/
CDC/FDA
1APHIS = USDA Animal and Plant Health inspection Service; FSIS = USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service; ERS = USDA Economic
Research Service; ARS = USDA Agricultural Research Service; CDC = US. Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention; and FDA = Food and Drug Administration.
the two, are often a prerequisite for building an economic
indicator. The quality of the economic indicator (e.g.,
cost of illness) will be directly dependent on the quality
of the physical data (e.g., incidence of illness).
There are several reasons why constructing these indica-
tors would be difficult. First, some of the possible data
sources listed are only potential sources. Many surveys
are not regular and ongoing, do not cover the entire
population of interest, or are not widely available for
analysis. The National Animal Health Monitoring System
conducted by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service only covers particular animals and focuses on
veterinary issues rather than food safety issues. FSIS
might be in a position to collect and report data from the
slaughter/processing level, but it has not made such data
public in the past. The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention data rely on the willingness of States, doctors,
and individuals to report illness and their ability to
identify a foodborne source of the illness. Therefore,
these data do not adequately represent the extent of
foodborne illness. Second, economic information often is
not available, even when proxy or physical indicators are
available. Economists need to work with the agencies that
are generating data to encompass the economic dimension
of physical indicators.
Conclusions
We have focused on laying out the range of possible
alternatives and the data needs for evaluating alternative
policies for managing food safety risks. We have not
presumed that either incentive- or standard-based ap-
proaches are preferable, but we have discussed their pros
and cons for addressing the complex issue of microbial
foodborne pathogens. A standards-based approach needs
to recognize the dual nature of HACCP as a process and
a product standard, and its preventive nature as a poten-
tial benefit for regulatory efficiency. Providing informa-
tion is often a preferred textbook solution, but given the
changing structure of food markets, it may or may not
address the underlying risks. Information approaches
must be carefully designed to actually improve decision-
making in the marketplace. Finally, regulatory approaches
must be flexible, recognizing that there is an incomplete
scientific basis for assessing the risks, producing safer
products, and evaluating product safety.
The size and complexity of food safety problems caused
by foodborne pathogens require careful consideration of
the alternative policy responses and possibilities for
managing the risks in the food supply. The failure of
private markets to provide adequate information to con-
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sumers due, in part, to the inherent variability of food
products and processing, indicates a role for regulation
and some Government involvement. What is required is
the ability to monitor problems and changes in food
safety risks, to identify priorities and alternatives for
policy interventions, and to evaluate those alternatives
within an economic framework. A coordinated effort is
needed to identify and link data that will indicate the
extent of the problems, to monitor changes (and improve-
ment), and to provide the feedback that policymakers
need to set priorities for directing scarce public and
private resources to reducing the risk of foodborne
disease.
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